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1

Introduction+
The key to a successful innovation tournament lies in the ability to extract the best few opportunities

from a process that considers many (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). In such contests, participation by many
agents can reduce individual effort and investment thanks to negative economic incentives (Taylor 1995,
Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che and Gale 2003) but these costs are offset by gains from the parallel
search efforts of the increased number of contestants (Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Boudreau et al. 2011).
This important characteristic has made tournaments effective processes for generating high quality
solutions to innovation challenges (Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). However, when
faced with designing such contests, administrators face numerous decisions with respect to how the
contest will run – from defining the challenge to soliciting entries to moderating the contest. Knowing
that participants adapt to different incentives and information, a key managerial challenge is how a
contest administrator can best design and operate a tournament.
In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of two methods of moderating entries to a contest – blind
and unblind. In blind contests, an entry’s visibility is limited to the individual who submitted it and the
contest administrator. Without observing the work of others, agents must innovate on their own from
scratch. In unblind contests, entries are fully visible to other participants; anyone can see the full slate of
submissions. The ability to observe directly some positions in the space of possibilities means that agents
no longer operate in a vacuum. Seeing other entries could broaden or limit idea exploration, redirect or
anchor searches, or inspire or stifle creativity. What effect does entry visibility have on contest
performance?
To answer this question, we report on a set of field experiments using web-based platforms for
graphic design tournaments. We manipulate contest visibility – either blind or unblind – and use real
contests and designers to test how changing the information available in the search process impacts
exploration. Specifically, our goal is to test for differences in participant behavior and contest outcomes
that stem from the administrator’s decision about entry visibility. As a secondary benefit, we also address
the common problem of how to deal with opt-in participation, which often occurs in the context of open
innovation and innovation tournaments.
Our experiment is unique in that it is the first to look at differences between innovation tournaments
with varying degrees of entry visibility. The eight contests we launched resulted in 665 submissions from
224 agents over the course of a week. A panel of target consumers then rated the quality of each entry,
giving us 11,380 distinct entry-ratings. Additionally, students grouped the entries into related clusters in
order to quantify the similarity between submissions. These measures – along with the detailed contest
administration data – allow us to analyze both participant entry and the characteristics of the work these
participants submit.
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Our results show that there are, in fact, differences in agent behavior and contest outcomes based on
the degree of entry visibility. We find that unblind tournaments generate more entries – not by inducing
more entries from existing agents but by increasing the number of agents that participate. We also find
that the degree of similarity among submissions increases in early periods, provided that agents can see
other entries. For single-entry participants, entry quality “ratchets up” with the best entry submitted by
other contestants previously if that entry is visible, while moving in the opposite direction if it’s not.
Unblind contests offer an environment in which to learn about the landscape and produce better entries.
However, for participants who submit more than once, those with better prior submissions improve more
when they cannot see the work of others. The variance in quality of entries also increases when entries are
not visible, usually a desirable property of tournament submissions.
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Visibility+in+Innovation+Tournaments+
Innovation tournaments have been shown to be effective processes for generating novel solutions

(Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). In fact, they have a long history of driving
progress, especially in the fields of engineering and design. Consider the famous Tower Bridge in
London, the largest and most sophisticated bascule and suspension bridge ever constructed when it went
up. At that time, London’s East End faced massive congestion, and delays for pedestrians and vehicles
were routinely several hours. A “Special Bridge or Subway Committee” convened in 1876 and announced
a contest to design a new public crossing on the Thames that wouldn’t disrupt commercial river traffic;
over 50 designs were submitted for consideration and produced the final design we see today.1
Such tournaments have typically been organized as blind contests with batched evaluation. That is,
designers submit one or more entries – without knowing what other ideas are submitted – and wait for a
panel to declare a winner. More recently, developments in information technology in several domains
have made submission and evaluation of entries to tournaments much less costly, allowing for sequential
in-process evaluation. For instance, the 2006 Netflix Prize sought a new recommendation algorithm for
its movie business. By automating the judging, Netflix could provide instantaneous scoring of
submissions, allowing the 5,169 teams (who submitted over 44,000 algorithms in total) to learn the
quality of their entries throughout the contest and resubmit.2 Netflix employed a blind contest with
sequential evaluation – entrants still couldn’t see the ideas that were submitted, but were scored in realtime and shown the distribution of results. Sequential scoring effectively changes innovation tournaments
from one-shot events to dynamic environments in which individuals can participate and learn iteratively.
Information technology has enabled other modifications to traditional contest features. One such
element is the blind constraint. Rather than maintain the precedent of restricting entry visibility, some
platforms have pulled back the curtain, allowing entrants to see the work of other contestants. This raises
1
2

The Corporation of London and the Tower Bridge Exhibition, www.towerbridge.org.uk (2013)
Netflix Prize, www.netflixprize.com (2013)
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the question of whether seeing other submissions helps or hurts contest outcomes. Anecdotally, the
market believes visibility of entries influences outcomes. The web-based contest platform 99Designs, one
of the sites we use in our field experiments, advertises that blind contests attract better designers, promote
creativity, and result in higher quality entries.3 Contrary to the popular adage echoed by Isaac Newton in a
1676 letter – “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” – this claim suggests that
seeing prior solution attempts does not improve outcomes. However, there has been no prior empirical
evidence that has directly explored this impact of entry visibility in innovation tournaments.

3

Literature+and+Hypothesis+Development+
Before we develop our hypotheses, we categorize some of the current literature in terms of the type

of contest examined (Table 1). This classification is used throughout the rest of the paper and, more
generally, as a review of the research that directly deals with innovation contests.
We examine the impact of moderating entry visibility by looking at blind and unblind contests. In
this paper, visibility specifically refers to the state of transparency surrounding an entry’s full and
complete solution. In blind contests, an entry’s visibility is limited to the individual who submitted it and
to the contest administrator; other participants may see ancillary information – such as who submitted it
or the rating it received – but not the innovation itself. This requires agents to innovate on their own. In
unblind contests, submitted entries are fully visible to other participants; anyone can see the full slate of
submissions.
In what ways might visibility of entries alter tournament outcomes? Once an agent has committed to
join a tournament, visibility of other entries should theoretically be beneficial to his or her problem
solving efforts. The other entries can be viewed simply as additional information – and from that
perspective should not degrade an agent's performance relative to not having that information. Indeed, an
agent could simply ignore the other entries and work from the problem statement with no other
information. The agent could then consider the other entries, and decide whether or not to create
additional entries based on that newly available information.
While theoretically appealing, this argument may not reflect the realities of human behavior. People
are unlikely to actually ignore readily visible entries from rivals, especially as they consider whether or
not to join a tournament. Thus, the visibility of the entries of others is likely to influence the outcome of a
tournament in at least two basic ways. First, the visibility of the entries of others may influence the
likelihood of entry from an agent, altering the number of entrants, their composition, and number of
entries each submits. Second, the visibility of the entries of others may influence the way in which a
particular agent addresses the challenge, possibly leading to differences in the search process and quality
of entries submitted by that agent. We refer to these two pathways of influence as entry and
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99Designs, www.99designs.com (2013)
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Table 1. Tournament Characteristics within the Literature
Visibility
Unblind
Unblind
Blind
Blind
Unblind
Blind
Blind
Unblind
Unblind
Blind
Blind
Blind
Blind
Blind
Blind
Unblind
Blind
Blind
Blind

Evaluation
Sequential
Sequential
Batched
Batched
Sequential
Sequential
Batched
Batched
Sequential
Batched
Sequential
Batched
Sequential
Batched
Batched
Sequential
Batched
Batched
Batched

Key7Result
Seeing&feedback&increases&entrants&and&quality;&Quality&rachets&up&with&prior&best
Ideators&can&get&stuck,&generating&less&diverse&ideas&after&success
Searchers&cluster&in&regions&(search&breadth&increases&with&entrants&subQlinearly)
Users&in&the&market&can&outperform&professionals&in&some&ideation&settings
Winning&agents&enter&earlier,&submit&over&time&(but&aren’t&helped&by&add'l&entries)
Uncertainty&amplifies&the&benefit&of&parallel&search
Incidence&of&redundancy&in&parallel&search&is&small&(<13%&across&several&domains)
Increases&in&rewards&and&market&maturity&attract&more&submissions
Cooperation&amongst&agents&can&be&a&beneficial&search&strategy
Agents&from&outside&fields&have&a&higher&chance&of&winning
Higher&award&levels,&less&crowded&markets,&and&easier&tasks&lead&to&more&entries
All&significant&outcomes&will&be&determined&by&the&most&efficient&contestant&types
Average&users&do&not&increase&their&chance&of&winning&with&experience
More&entrants&and&parallel&search&offset&underinvestment&by&any&one&contest&agent
Winning&agents&work&twice&as&long&on&their&solutions
Group&decisions&in&visible&idea&markets&can&improve&evaluation
Ideas&can&be&misclassified&or&misjudged&by&users
Analogical&thinking&can&benefit&ideation&strategies&
MultiQstage&contests&differ&from&oneQshot&events
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characteristics of entries, respectively. We consider each of these in turn, relating the effects to the
literature and posing hypotheses for our experiments.
3.1

Entry
The number of entries to a tournament is a function of both the number of entrants to the tournament

and the number of entries submitted by each entrant. Here we consider how entry visibility impacts each
of these variables.
To begin, we acknowledge the long-established incentive effect in contests, which equates to agents
reducing their effort or participation in response to increased numbers of competitors. This relationship
has gathered considerable attention in the economics literature (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Casas-Arce and
Martínez-Jerez 2009) and innovation contest literature (Taylor 1995, Fullerton and McAfee 1999, Che
and Gale 2003). Recently, researchers have emphasized how distinct features in the context of innovation
problems can overcome these negative contest incentives (Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Boudreau et al. 2011).
Boudreau et al. (2011) demonstrate that increased uncertainty – in terms of who will achieve the best
outcome – reduces the incentive to scale back effort. Based on this prior result, a first prediction might
assert that increasing entry visibility should reduce uncertainty and therefore reduce participation.
However, we will make the opposite claim.
The view that entry visibility will reduce uncertainty rests on the implicit idea that seeing a full
solution provides information about its probability of winning. It is important to note that ancillary
information – such as who submitted an entry or the rating it received – may be observed independent of
the state of entry visibility. A large part (or even all) of the information to be gleaned about the
probabilities of winning may reside with such ancillaries instead of the solution specification. More
importantly, however, visible entries reveal a different type of information. Seeing the ideas of others can
inform participants about the landscape of possible solutions and the administrator’s quality function.
Before running with the ‘uncertainty effect’ prediction above, we examine the implications of this more
nuanced effect of landscape and learning. The number of contest entrants could increase with entry
visibility because of a lower cost of entry, more appealing community experience, and from a superiority
bias on the part of entrants, or the number of entrants could decrease as a result of intellectual property
concerns.
Individuals might face lower entry costs thanks to having a better map of the solution landscape, lots
of seed ideas from which to begin their search, or exemplars that can be changed incrementally with less
work than starting from scratch. In searching for solutions, effective strategies can include analogical
thinking (Dahl and Moreau 2002), recombination of acquired expertise (Lakhani et al. 2007), and
cooperation among agents competing in the same search (Bullinger et al. 2010). This idea is partly
formalized as the path of least resistance, an idea within psychology’s structured imagination construct
where people modify existing solutions when faced with problems requiring creativity (Ward 1994). We
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see one derivation of this idea from Wooten and Ulrich (2014), in which knowing where good ideas occur
on the landscape – through visible feedback – results in more contest entrants over time.
Increased visibility could promote more appealing social engagement and intrinsically more
interesting work. Seeing other entries could also trigger cognitive biases (Alick et al. 1995) and induce
greater participation from a better-than-average self-perception. The overconfidence bias is well
documented, with several decades of research in a variety of contexts (Kahneman and Tversky 1977),
including those seeking to invent new ideas (Åstebro et al. 2007). Each of these suggests that seeing other
entries may results in more entrants per contest.
Bockstedt et al. (2011) highlight one disadvantage of entry visibility; namely, the perceived potential
for intellectual property loss. If the perceived threat of having an idea “stolen” is high enough, it could be
a deterrent to entry. Of course, instead of opting out, agents could decide to devote more effort and stake a
claim to the area around an idea, with increased submissions to discourage infringement from
competitors, which leads to our second participation variable – entries per entrant.
The number of entries per entrant could increase with entry visibility thanks to lower search costs –
in much the same way as the entry decision could be affected. It is possible that a spirit of competition is
induced by revealing the work of the participants. In unblind contests, several empirical studies analyze
how contest characteristics impact contestant participation (Table 1), including increased entries with
market maturity (Walter and Back 2011) and less complex tasks (Yang et al. 2010). However, most of
these studies study total contest entries instead of the behavior of contestants within a contest. Bockstedt
et al. (2011) empirically demonstrate that winning agents on LogoMyWay.com are more likely to enter
earlier and submit entries over a wider range of time, but aren’t helped by simply entering more ideas.
On balance, we expect that greater entry visibility in innovation tournaments will result in increased
participation. All but one of the hypothesized effects suggest that contest entries will be greater in
contests with entry visibility. Unblind contests make an agent’s key decisions easier. The choices around
whether to enter and the amount of effort to invest both derive benefits from entry visibility. By seeing
other entries in the landscape of possibilities, the barriers to entry are lower for any given agent and more
information on the administrator’s quality function is available. Easier search should result in more entry.
Hypothesis 1: Increasing entry visibility in an innovation tournament (by moving from a blind to
an unblind contest) will increase the number of entries submitted.
3.2

Characteristics of Entries
Given that we expect the number of entries to change, do the characteristics of those entries also

change? Entry visibility may influence the way in which a particular agent addresses the challenge,
possibly leading to differences in the search process and quality of entries submitted by that agent. Two
relevant metrics of the characteristics of entries are similarity and quality, including both the mean and
distribution.
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Similarity. Independent of idea quality, seekers usually benefit from knowing the landscape –
observing diverse ideas gives a more complete picture of the solution possibilities. The incidence of
redundancy in parallel search has been shown to be quite small in blind contests (Kornish and Ulrich
2011). In unblind contests, entry visibility could mean even less redundancy in effort, with agents using
the knowledge of competitors’ submissions to reduce repetition. Or such visibility could inhibit parallel
search, with entrants clustering their submissions around existing proven entries (Erat and Krishnan
2012). Either way, if a participant searches differently in response to seeing other entries, then the
resulting similarity among entries should change.
In a set of graphic design prototyping experiments around online ads, participants who saw multiple
shared designs borrowed significantly more features to incorporate in their own ads (Dow et al. 2012). In
creativity tasks, Marsh et al. (1996) found that individuals who saw many examples tended to incorporate
critical elements in their own designs (although without inhibiting creativity), and Smith et al. (1993)
found conformity in every group that saw examples, across a range of conditions and instructions. In
unblind contests, more designs will be visible to agents, and we expect the prior conformity results to play
out in innovation contests.
Hypothesis 2: Increasing the visibility of entries in an innovation tournament will result in
submissions that are more similar.
Quality. At the level of the contest, the population of entries yields a distribution of quality,
reflecting the overall performance of the tournament. This idea arises from the statistical view of
innovation processes (March 1991; Dahan and Mendelson 2001; Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). One way to
describe the quality distribution is with mean and variance, and increases in each of these variables
improve the overall performance of tournaments (Girotra et al. 2010).
The mean quality of entries is driven by both the quality of entrants and the quality of the work those
entrants do. If a tournament attracts better entrants or better submissions from its existing entrants, overall
contest performance improves. However, in many settings, it’s not possible to truly disentangle the
intrinsic quality of entrants from the work they do. Here, we rely on entry quality as the aggregate
measure of these two drivers and explore how that quality might be influenced by entry visibility.
Exposure to additional information in unblind contests likely impacts the learning environment.
Openness and information sharing has long been identified as important to scientific progress (Merton
1942, Mulkay 1975), with examples such as open source software development at the recent forefront
(von Hippel 2005). In evolutionary economics, the role of search has been highlighted as a mechanism for
discovering variety and allowing organizations to develop new technologies (Nelson and Winter 1982).
Metcalfe (1994) suggests that exploring such variety allows firms to innovate more successfully by seeing
a range of potential options or paths to explore.
We would expect participants to learn the most and have the best understanding of the search
landscape when full information from all the parallel searches is visible. In the design world, having
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examples readily available has been shown to improve the appeal of designs, although these benefits
appear to accrue to novice designers more than to experts (Lee et al. 2010). With visible entries, the
learning effect could also help with self-filtering. If contestants have some ability to assess their own
work, they may balk at submitting lower-quality designs after seeing those already submitted, which
would increase mean quality.
Unlike the above arguments, some operators of web-based platforms for innovation contests assert
that blind contests result in better entries, with the rationale that blind contests attract higher quality talent.
If better designers don’t benefit from the presence of examples as Lee at al. find, then other benefits of the
blinded format (such as intellectual property protection) could be attractive. On balance, however, we
believe that there is more evidence on the side of increased information and learning, as mechanisms for
increasing the average quality of entries.
Hypothesis 3: Increasing the visibility of entries in an innovation tournament will increase the
average quality of entries submitted.
Finally, variance in the quality of submissions, for a given mean, improves tournament outcomes, as
flatter distributions result in more ideas in the upper tail of the distribution (Girotra et al. 2010). Such
benefits could be driven by both variance in the quality of entrants and by variance in the quality of the
work they do. Given the uncertainty in the task and conditional on a given set of entrants, variance in
approach is expected to be one of the key drivers of variance in quality. The way in which an agent
searches the landscape likely impacts variance in the quality distribution. Thus, it follows from our
similarity hypothesis (H2) that we expect less variance in approach in visible tournaments, and by
implication less variation in quality. Wooten and Ulrich (2014) similarly found that more information
about the administrator’s quality function results in a convergence of approaches and decreased variance
in the quality of contest submissions.
Hypothesis 4: Increasing the visibility of entries in an innovation tournament will decrease the
variance in quality of entries.

4

Experimental+Design+
We conducted a set of field experiments in which we explicitly control the environment and compare

the performance of innovation contests with varying levels of visibility. We’ve used these platforms for
experiments before; however, here we use a completely new set of experiments designed specifically to
address the issue of visibility in contests. We follow similar conventions as those used by Wooten and
Ulrich (2014) for the setup, delivery of feedback, and measure of entry quality in an online graphic design
field experiment. Four pairs of logo design competitions were posted on two online design contest
marketplaces, 99Designs and CrowdSpring. The competitions differed in terms of the amount of
information visible to entrants – in the unblind treatment, agents could see all entries and feedback while
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in the blind treatments, the entries of others were not visible. At the conclusion of the contests, a
consumer panel rated the quality of each entry and a pool of university students rated their similarity.
4.1

Contest Platforms
Our experiments were hosted by two online companies, 99Designs and CrowdSpring, that have

emerged as leaders in the crowd-sourced design market. They allow buyers to solicit projects – such as
logo creation – from a community of graphic designers. While buyers are mostly small businesses and
entrepreneurs, established companies such as Amazon, Starbucks, Microsoft, Philips, Barilla, and TiVo
have also run contests. Contest winners are awarded predetermined cash prizes – normally between $150
and $1,500 per contest. The sites support robust marketplaces. As an example, 99Designs has awarded
over $79 million worth of contest prizes in more than 317,000 contests since its founding in 2007.
The two platforms are very similar, with nearly identical interfaces and business implementations.
Each website counts over 125,000 designers as members and targets an array of design projects (such as
logos, packaging, book covers, and website design). Clients create a contest by posting project
specifications and a prize amount. Over a project’s duration (generally one week), online submissions are
submitted by interested designers and feedback can be given by the client.
4.2

Contests
Four pairs of contests were launched as follows.
A: Burning Barn BBQ Sauce
Smoking Silo Salsa

B: Wave Monkey Headphones
Sound Chimp Speakers

C: Power Perk Coffee
Bold Brew Tea

D: Jailbird Dog Gear
Rat Pack Cat Company

All eight contests had similar details, and within each pair, projects had nearly identical details, including
company type, name, design specifications, deliverables, target markets, and specifics of the design brief.
Each logo was for a new consumer product brand whose target audience was specified to be collegeeducated U.S. consumers 18-35 years old. Designers were told that a panel of consumers from this market
would be the ultimate judges of entry quality. The contests in each pair shared the type of product
(condiments, audio electronics, beverages, and pet accessories), were constructed with similar name
characteristics and motifs, and were randomly assigned to one of the two websites. An example of the
submitted design briefs is Appendix A.
Designers count on feedback over the course of contests to determine performance of any particular
entry. The established feedback mechanism on both 99Designs and CrowdSpring is a one-to-five star
rating, which indicates how much the administrator likes an entry. We provided new entries with
feedback every morning using this scale; a three-person panel of independent judges scored each design
and their average determined the rating, expressed as a number of stars. The raters fit the target market
demographic (consistent with our design brief), and we used two such panels to manage the volume from
four concurrent contests. This feedback was intended to be highly correlated with the final ratings which
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would eventually be produced by an evaluation by a larger panel of consumers at the conclusion of the
contest.
4.3

Treatments
The independent variable tested was entry visibility in each contest. CrowdSpring and 99Designs

permit both blind and unblind contests, which allows the administrator to choose at the outset who can
see a designer’s submissions. In unblind projects, anyone who views the contest can see the full slate of
designs that have been entered as well as any scored feedback given (in the form of star ratings). Thus,
the general public has full information about submissions and their in-process ratings. In blind projects,
an entry’s visibility is limited to the designer who submitted it and the contest administrator. Other
designers know how many designs have been entered – and by whom – but are restricted from viewing
the actual submission. Figure 1 gives examples from set A in our experiments, showing the blind contest
views from 99Designs and the unblind views from CrowdSpring as they appeared on the sites.
4.4

Experiment
We denote the four pairs corresponding to the four product types as A, B, C, and D. One of each pair

ran on 99Designs and its nearly identical corollary ran on CrowdSpring, allowing for each visibility
treatment to be tested twice on each site in a balanced design. Designers closely monitor the contests on
these websites and frequently report copyright violations and other such concerns. To deal with such
savvy agents and avoid undermining the outcomes, we constructed the experiment design to utilize two
different website platforms, slightly staggered start dates, and small differences in the award levels. The
Figure 1. Example of Treatment Information (set A)

Unblind'
'
'

!(CrowdSpring)!

Blind'

!(99Designs)!
!

Public!View!

Administrator!View!
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contest pairs ran over the course of two weeks. Sets A and B ran during the first week, and sets C and D
ran during the second. CrowdSpring and 99Designs display the award amount in slightly different ways,
but sets A and C carried award levels of $250 for the winner, and awards for sets B and D were $237.
These slight differences were built into the contest setup to make the contests nearly identical, without
tipping the designers off that the products weren’t real. The visibility treatment can be denoted by
subscripts (B for blind and U for unblind) resulting in the following contest layout:
99Designs:

AB

BU

CU$$

DB

CrowdSpring:

AU

BB

CB

DU

The eight contests relied on the standard mechanisms of the websites to entice designers to participate; we
address the challenges of opt-in participation in section 5. Each contest was open to anyone on the
respective website, ran for seven days, received daily feedback, and resulted in an award to the winning
designer. All experiments were conducted after obtaining approval from the human subjects committee at
the university.
4.5

Evaluation
A total of 665 entries were generated by 224 designers over the course of the eight tournaments. Two

panels of 20 judges independently and anonymously evaluated the logos from the perspective of potential
consumers. The judges were representative of the target market outlined in the contest briefs – collegeeducated individuals between the ages of 18 and 35. These judges were similar in profile but distinct from
the feedback panelists, who provided the daily star ratings.
Ratings were collected using web-based surveys. One panel of judges rated logos in sets A and D;
the other rated logos in sets B and C. Following the design of Wooten and Ulrich (2014), entries from the
eight contests were administered in separate surveys and were completed as paired sets. To mitigate order
effects, surveys were administered as a balanced, repeated Latin square design; each set order (AD, DA,
BC, CB) appeared the same number of times. Within each set, half the judges were given the contest from
99Designs first followed by the one from CrowdSpring; the other half saw them in the opposite order.
Within each individual survey, the logos were presented to each judge in a randomized order. The
question and response choices (on a 1-5 rating scale) were the same for the judges as for the in-contest
feedback panel.
One contest (Wave Monkey Headphones, with 192 entries) exceeded the survey length threshold
established in similar settings (Girotra et al. 2010, Wooten and Ulrich 2014). As a result, each judge rated
half of the designs in that contest; for those 20 judges, the assignment of particular logos followed a
balanced, repeated Latin square design in which each rater saw 96 logos and each logo received 10 raters.
The judges’ responses to the eight surveys provide the measure of entry quality for our analysis. We
find that the reliability of judges is high (Table 2). We check this using a Krippendorff alpha test on our
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Table 2. Inter-rater Reliability of Judges (Krippendorff Alpha)
Contest
A: Burning Barn BBQ Sauce
A: Smoking Silo Salsa
B: Sound Chimp Speakers
C: Power Perk Coffee
C: Bold Brew Tea
D: Jailbird Dog Gear
D: Rat Pack Cat Company
Average

Interval Alpha
Judges’ Ratings
0.35
0.21
0.0 4
0.12
0.11
0.23
0.0 8

Interval Alpha
Bootstrap Averages
0.84
0.80
0.72
0.72
0.65
0.74
0.57

0.16

0.72

Note: Judges’ Ratings analyzes degree of agreement among the 20 judges on every logo’s rating;
Bootstrap Averages measures the agreement between a 10-judge random sample of the 20-judge
panel and the remaining 10 judges on the average logo rating; Wave Monkey Headphones
omitted because of Latin square missing values.

population of raters. Given the artistic nature of our contests, we expect high variation in the scores
because of personal preferences. This is corroborated with a relatively low degree of agreement between
any two judges. However, if populations have stable preferences, then a high degree of agreement should
be seen in the average scores of entries across populations. We test this with a bootstrap approach,
splitting our judges into two randomized groups and comparing the average scores for each logo between
groups. With this population-level approach, we obtain an agreement alpha of 0.72, above accepted
thresholds. A sample of the scored logos is provided in Figure 2.

5

The+OptCin+Problem+
The gold standard in experiment design is randomization, in which subjects are randomly allocated

among treatment groups. In our field experiments, subject randomization isn’t possible – platform
participants freely choose which contests to join. By relying on this platform mechanism, we increase the
ecological/external validity of our study but also raise several questions by having subjects opt in. The
growing number of online platforms increases the frequency with which these issues are likely to be
encountered in empirical studies. We use this section to discuss the opt-in problem in an abstract way and
get some purchase on our particular selection issues.
The most basic question when dealing with opting-in (self-selection) in any context is whether the
samples mirror the population of interest. In addition, our setup also highlights an increasingly common
issue – accounting for participation in a dynamic system. By this, we mean situations in which agents
may choose to participate at any point in a defined time window and throughout which characteristics of
the opted-into event or system may change. Our contests fit this description. Potential entrants can
observe several dynamic variables (including number of entries, specific entrants, and administrator
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scoring in both treatments) over the course of each contest. To our knowledge, no one has addressed how
to account for opt-in behavior in this setting.

Figure 2. Examples of Logos Generated (sets A and B)
Highest Rated

Median

Lowest Rated

Burning Barn
BBQ Sauce 1,B

Smoking Silo
Salsa 2,U

Wave Monkey
Headphones 1,U

Sound Chimp
Speakers 2,B

1: 99Designs, 2: CrowdSpring; B: Blind (no visibility), U: Unblind (full visibility)
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We examine six scenarios (shown in Table 3) as a framework for addressing opt-in behavior, with
the visibility of the treatment and the presence of dynamic information as the conditions of interest.
Treatment visibility is simply whether the experiment treatment is observable to an agent when they
decide to opt in. For example, in our experiments, the ability to see other entries (our treatment) was
obvious to potential entrants, so treatment visibility would be coded as ‘yes.’ Dynamic information
describes whether the information that an agent evaluates in making their opt-in decision can change over
time. In our case, certain participation data was publicly known and changed over the week that the
contests ran, so dynamic info would also be coded as ‘yes.’ Dynamic systems can be observed in many
participation-based markets (i.e., eBay auctions, open innovation contests, crowdfunding projects),
making this a growing area of interest.
To ground our discussion, we begin with two situations where participants do not opt in. (We
explicitly define opting-in as a choice of deliberate participation on the part of an agent.) Randomized
treatment assignment accounts for both observed and unobserved participant characteristics; this is the
best-case scenario, which is often possible in the lab environment. Boudreau et al. (2011) provides a nice
example of this case where the composition of randomized individuals in a contest influences the degree
of participation. In other situations, a biased or truncated population results in an imperfect sample.
Heckman (1979) originally attacked this problem of nonrandomly selected samples via two-step
estimation. Correcting endogeneity through econometric techniques has gained considerable attention in
the last few decades. Guo and Fraser (2009) offer a compelling overview of sample selection and
treatment effect models, dating back to the original econometric framework introduced by Heckman.
Table 3. Methods to Account for Participant Self-Selection
Participant) Treatment) Dynamic)
Opt+in?
Visible?
Info?
no)
either
either
(random)
no)))))))))
no
no
(biased)
yes

no

no

yes

yes

no

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

Correction

Rationale
Randomization)takes)care)of)both)observed)and)
None
unobserved)traits.)(Worth)checking)sample)sizes.)
2+step)estimator)
Adds)expl.)variable)to)account)for)background)
(Heckman)correction) traits)in)truncated/biased)populations.
Corrects)for)sample)selection)or)treatment)effects)
2+step)estimator;)
with)two)steps;)Includes)fixed/random)effects)for)
Effects)model
observable)traits)to)account)for)samples.
Outcomes)are)of)paramount)interest.)))
None*
Mechanism)interesting)but)not)required.)(Could)
be)disentangled)via)lab)study.)
Proposed)opt+in)
Proposed!opt?in!
characterization)
characterization!
hierarchy
hierarchy!

Presence)of)dynamic)info)permits)some)visibility)
into)opt+in)behavior.)Goal)is)to)control)dynamic)
pieces)and)simulate)one)of)the)above)scenarios.

*!Depends!on!type!of!opt?in;!No!correction!works!in!certain!settings.!Observable!characteristics!could!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!help!illuminate!participant!choices!in!others.!Two?step!estimator!approach!possible.!
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While labor economics begat many of the now-standard techniques, other fields have begun to adapt their
methods and develop richer discussions around endogeneity. As an example, Hamilton and Nickerson
(2003) highlight one such exploration in the field of strategic management. We lay this out, not to offer a
robust review of the literature, but to signal the opportunity that exists. Here, we offer some cursory
thoughts, but a more comprehensive methods paper could attack several of the issues we raise –
especially with respect to dynamic information.
In the case of no treatment visibility and no dynamic information (row 3), a 2-step estimator or an
effects model could help address the sample opt-ins. When the decision to opt in is influenced by the
treatment being observable (row 4), one could argue that no controls or allowances are needed. This could
be the case if two treatments draw from the same population and have static information. With no other
differences, the treatment becomes part of the opt-in decision. Using no correction focuses on the ultimate
outcome – namely, what effect does choosing a particular treatment have? We conjecture that a two-step
estimator approach could achieve a workable method (determining the various effects from the
participation decision, the treatment effect in the system, and the unobservable traits), but disentangling
the unobservables and participation decision is not trivial. A first step might be a switching model for
treatment effects, acknowledging that the open choice to opt-in to many contests is not a binary choice.
However, using no correction also provides a defensible alternative.
The final two cases (rows 5 and 6) also have dynamic information to contend with. By this, we mean
situations in which agents choose their level of involvement based on system observables that change
over time. Because the prior cases have no way to deal with dynamic systems, we propose to first address
whether the participant populations are similar, then control for the dynamic information influencing optins, and finally use one of the previous solutions (row 3 or 4).
For assessing the populations and dynamic information, some characterization of the population is
often needed. Our hierarchy for this characterization of opt-ins consists of three tiers. Tier one has
objective measures of a dimension similar to the dependent variable. In our case, we are interested in idea
quality, so designer skill, talent, or effort could be the tier one measures. Tier two has measures that are
indirectly related to the dependent variable. In our case, experience or education achievement would
qualify. Tier three includes other observables that may or may not be directly related with the dependent
variable but may contain some information about participants. In our case, designer location or language
ability fit those criteria. These tiers are ordered, with tier one likely being more instructive than tier two
and so on. In the following sections, we use these tiers to characterize the platform populations and
control for the dynamic information in the contests.
5.1

Comparing Platform Populations
In this section, we assess whether the populations on our two platforms are similar. This allows us to

compare the contests with more confidence. In some settings, scraping the profile information for every
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agent on the platform would accomplish this. In our setting, there are two issues with that approach. First,
not all designers are represented by viewable profiles. For example, on CrowdSpring, only 38% of the
more than 158,000 designers have an active profile in 2014. Deactivated accounts and site restrictions
likely account for most of this drop. (When we add deactivated accounts back in, the average designer
reputation score on CrowdSpring falls from 71.5 to 58.9, suggesting that less successful designers leave
over time as one would expect.) This finding warrants checking any platform profiling for such
omissions. Second, the active population – not the total population – is the group of interest. At the time
of the contest, which designers were active on the site and actually had a chance to opt-in to our contest?
That more granular population (while sometimes difficult to obtain) makes for a more appropriate
comparison. These issues are compounded if the data collection does not happen in parallel with the
experiment.
Here, we address both of those concerns by randomly choosing 10 contests on each site (median
prize: 99Designs = $295, CrowdSpring = $304) from the 3 months immediately after our experiment and
using the designers who participated in those 10 contests as a proxy for each platform’s population at the
time. We record profile information (from the contest page instead of the possibly-deactivated profile
pages) for 296 of 330 unique designers on 99Designs and all 335 unique designers on CrowdSpring. This
gives a snapshot of the agents who were active on the sites at the time of our experiment. A summary of
their experience and performance is shown in Table 4.
Skill, experience, and demographics are three categories of information that could help assess our
two populations. These are ordered, with skill likely being more instructive than experience, which is
likely more instructive than demographic info. The top three rows in Table 4 summarize the agents’
experience; the bottom three rows address their skill. We omit demographics since we have data from the
more instructive tiers.
Days of platform experience (2011) gives the number of days between a designer registering an
account and our capture period concluding (in July 2011). The alternate all days measure shows the
number of days from registration until the most recent login (adjusted partial results shown for
CrowdSpring). Number of contests entered reveals the number of contests entered by designers on
CrowdSpring; it excludes those profiles (~16%) that withdrew from all contests they didn’t win in an
attempt to manipulate their profile stats. In terms of designer experience, we see similar breadth of
experience at the time of our experiment (mean of 321 vs. 307 days), with some high-volume designers
on the top end of the distribution, as expected.
Talent is harder to measure. We report number of contests won as a retrospective look at skill (the
figures are from 2014, which is better than observing the same figure in 2011 and penalizing new
designers). An issue with contests won is that it depends on the number of contests available on the site.
We observe a lower mean number of wins on CrowdSpring; however, the ratio of contests to designers is
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significantly lower (0.27 vs. 1.01) as well, so the average CrowdSpring designer will collect fewer wins
by default.
Another measure of talent is available – each site algorithmically assigns a skill score to each
participant, which we denote as Reputation (99Designs refers to it as Level). As seen in Table 4, these
have different scales. 99Designs’ scale starts from 0 and is additive, with better designers moving up the
ladder. A double-digit score is reasonably good in their system and usually corresponds to dozens of
wins. CrowdSpring’s scale ranges 0-100 but starts from 70, from which new designers move up or down
based on their performance. The skill ratings for 99Designs are right-skewed (with most scores clumped
at the bottom) and those for CrowdSpring are left-skewed (with most scores clumped at the top). To
permit comparisons, we translated each of these measures of talent into an adjusted z-score, using log and
flipped log transformations suggested by Tabachnick and Howell (2007) for the two different skewed
scales. Perhaps the most useful measure would be win rate (number of wins/number of contests entered),
which is only available for CrowdSpring. However, there is anecdotal data that suggests our metrics are
analogous across the two sites. Comparing users who participate on both platforms (4 out of 665
designers in the sample), the site metrics for those four show remarkable consistency (Table 5). While
only a small sample, the reputation and win data are well aligned and offer support for using them to
represent designer talent, the trait in which we are interested.
In summary, our 20 randomly selected contests produced similar populations, with nearly identical
numbers of unique designers (330 vs. 335), similar days of experience (321 vs. 307), and a seemingly
similar spread of talent. We offer these comparisons as further evidence (along with section 4) of similar
populations on each of our platforms at the time of our experiment. Subsequent analysis uses each of the
above measures and explores the samples in a more detailed analysis.

Table 4. Ex Post Platform Comparison of Experience and Talent – 99Designs vs. CrowdSpring

Days+of+platform+experience+(2011)
Days+of+platform+experience+(all)
No.+contests+entered

Min
5
7
AA

No.+contests+won
Reputation+(raw+platform+metric)
Reputation+(adjusted+zAscore)

0.0
1.0
A1.4

99Designs
Median Mean
178
321
1,131 1,088
AA
AA
5.0
6.0
0.2

18.2
8.7
0.0

Max
1,659
2,688
AA

Min
28
AA
1

152.0
48.0
2.0

0.0
1.0
A1.2

CrowdSpring
Median Mean
214
307
AA
1,033
70
222
1.0
72.0
A0.1

9.2
58.9
0.0

Note:++Represents+296+unique+99Designs+designers+and+
335+unique+CrowdSpring+designers+(MayAJul+2011)

Max
1,192
2,202
2,811
232.0
100.0
2.9
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Table 5. Platform Comparison using Identical Designers – 99Designs vs. CrowdSpring

Reputation.(raw.platform.metric)
Reputation.(adjusted.zAscore)
No..contests.won
Date.of.site.registration

5.2

BrandingDesigner
99D
CS
40
90
1.83
0.77
64
38

FishDzn
99D
CS
7
81
0.30
0.25
5
4

3/22/11 9/22/09 4/29/10 5/20/10

Alaguraj
99D
CS
1
28
A1.40
A0.88
0
0
5/8/11

5/8/11

Apanasara
99D
CS
1
22
A1.40
A0.95
0
0
5/26/11 5/17/11

Assessing Opt-in Samples
Given similar populations, our next issue addresses whether the opt-in samples in our experiment

mirror those populations. Table 6 shows our skill metrics (# Wins and Reputation) for each of the
contests. These match up well with our population data, with mean wins (20.7 for 99Designs and 11.1 for
CrowdSpring) not differing significantly from the population set means (18.2 and 9.2). The reputation
metrics are also aligned (0.0 and 0.1 sample vs. 0.0 and 0.0 population) for the two sites. Additionally, the
highlighted rows in Table 6 give a glimpse into the role that dynamic information plays in the opt-in
story. The two contests with the best entrants (more wins and better reputation) are also the ones with the
fewest participants. This suggests that entry by successful designers may preclude other designers from
opting-in. This idea echoes the findings of Boudreau et al. (2011), where the composition of individuals
in programming contests influenced the degree of participation. We examine this impact of dynamic
information more fully in section 7.
Table 6. Sample Comparison in Experiment
Contest
BurningBarn
WaveMonkey
PowerPerk
JailbirdDog
SmokingSilo
SoundChimp
BoldBrew
RatPack

Blind?

Site

Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N

99D
99D
99D
99D
CS
CS
CS
CS

#MEntrants #MEntries
36
48
30
8
24
20
29
29

82
192
91
40
57
53
69
81

#MWins
Mean Median
17
9
17
6
24
6
25
18
6
3
21
7
10
3
8
4

Reputation
Mean Median
40.15
40.19
40.05
0.01
0.08
0.01
0.20
0.36
40.14
40.18
0.36
0.15
0.01
40.26
0.21
0.02

Note:!Lowest!participation!(highlighted!rows)!in!contests!with!best!entrants!(highest!wins!and!reputation).!!!

6

Data+
Table 7a is a summary of each contest’s outcome. Given our experimental design, we also have a

great deal of entry-level data, which we analyze to test our four hypotheses.
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6.1

Measuring Entry
To measure entry behavior we capture entries, entrants, and entries per entrant.
An entry is defined as an idea submission to a particular contest and captures the aggregate level of

participation in a contest. The more participation a contest elicits, the more entries there are, resulting in
more potential solutions for the contest administrator.
An entrant is a distinct contest participant, someone who submits at least one entry. The more
attractive the contest, the more entrants it attracts, which increases the number of parallel searches that
occur.
Entries per entrant is defined as the number of submissions by a contest participant. We use it to
estimate the effort invested by an entrant with the idea that submitting more entries requires additional
effort.
Table 7a. Contest Summary
!

Condiments!

Audio'Electronics!

!

Burning!
Smoking!
Barn!BBQ!
Silo!Salsa!
Sauce!

Wave!
Sound!
Monkey!
Chimp!
Headphones! Speakers!

Beverages'
Power!
Perk!
Coffee!

Pet'Accessories!

Bold!
Jailbird!
Brew!Tea! Dog!Gear!

Rat!Pack!
Cat!
Company!

Visibility!

Blind!

Unblind!

Unblind!

Blind!

Unblind!

Blind!

Blind!

Unblind!

Website!

99D!

CS!

99D!

CS!

99D!

CS!

99D!

CS!

N!Entries!

82!

57!

192!

53!

91!

69!

40!

81!

N!Entrants!

36!

24!

48!

20!

30!

29!

8!

29!

Best!Logo!

3.75!

3.65!

3.70!

3.26!

3.15!

3.20!

3.35!

3.40!

Mean!Logo!!

2.54!

2.44!

2.40!

2.32!

2.21!

2.51!

2.36!

2.45!

S.D.!

0.77!

0.58!

0.50!

0.35!

0.48!

0.45!

0.63!

0.39!

Average!
Similarity!

0.186!

0.196!

0.217!

0.161!

0.186!

0.164!

0.170!

0.210!

!

!!Note:!Values!listed!for!logos!are!averages!of!judges’!ratings!on!1?5!scale;!Wave!Monkey!scores!adjusted!for!judge.!

6.2

Measuring Characteristics of Entries – Similarity
The second question we ask concerns the search process: How does the ability to see other entries

change the way in which agents address the challenge?
To assess whether agents incorporate elements from previously submitted entries, we need a
quantitative measure of logo similarity. Kornish and Ulrich (2011) tackle a similar problem in rating sets
of innovation opportunities. We adopt a similar methodology in order to obtain a similarity score for
every pair of entries in a contest. We had student subjects in the university behavioral laboratory form
groups of similar entries from a packet of logo submissions. A packet contained a subset of logos from a
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single contest; each logo was printed on a square of cardstock. This allowed students to visually sort and
re-sort the logos into piles quickly. Entries could be categorized into more than one cluster.
We created 45 such packets, with overlapping subsets of entries such that most entry pairs appeared
multiple times. When multiple logos varied only by color, we only included only one version of a logo. In
total, we ran 89 students through our protocol. They were paid $5 for participating. Sessions were not
timed and most students finished the grouping task in 10-20 minutes. The grouping task resulted in a list
of idea clusters that we could turn into a measure of pairwise similarity. The average cluster contained 5.5
logos per group. We coded each of the entries grouped together as similar and calculated an overall score
between every possible pair based on the percentage of times those two entries were placed in the same
cluster. This measure is the number of times two logos were grouped together over the number of times
such a pairing was possible. The final score is modified to account for our packet structure and the subsets
included. The similarity score between any two entries i and j is represented in the matrix Aijk, where k
represents the contest.
To measure how changes in entry visibility affect the similarity of submissions, our similarity metric
takes two forms. Average contest similarity is the mean of all possible pairwise similarities within a
contest, Āk. Logo-level similarity is the similarity score of a particular logo based on all the logos
submitted before it. In other words, how similar a particular logo j is to prior logos i, Āijk where i < j, for
each k.
6.3

Measuring Characteristics of Entries – Quality
To measure contest quality, we operationalize the quality distribution through two parameters –

mean and variance. One benefit of this approach is that it breaks the measure of quality into underlying
variables and helps mitigate the problem of sampling only winning ideas, which can be noisy in a small
sample of contests.
For the quality models, the quality measure comes from the judges’ scoring of contest entries and the
unit of analysis is the rating of a particular judge of a particular logo. Individual logo rating is thus the
dependent variable with the following independent variables: treatment (Blind), cumulative number of
entries (Entries), the best prior submission by others (Max), and the agent’s best prior entry (Personal
best).
For variance in the quality of ideas, we construct a measure of variance for the dependent variable
that takes out the linear quality improvement trend over the course of the contests, identical to Wooten
and Ulrich (2014) and similar to Girotra et al. (2010). Table 7b provides descriptive statistics and
correlations for the variables used in our analysis.
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Table 7b. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Variable
Rating
Visibility (blind)
Domain
Site
Day
Judge
# Prior entries
Max
Personal best
# Entries
# Entrants
# Entries/entrant
Avg. contest similarity

Definition
Numerical score of quality for an idea from judge
Contest visibility treatment – 0: Unblind, 1: Blind
Control for product area – 0: Condiments, 1: Audio elec., 2: Beverages, 3: Pet prod.
Control for platform – 0: 99Designs, 1: CrowdSpring
Control for day of contest – 1: Mon, 2: Tue, … 7: Sun
Control for individual providing the rating
Number of entries submitted to a contest at a logo’s time of entry
Highest score produced by others in contest thus far
Highest score produced by a given entry's agent in contest thus far
Number of submissions in a contest (or over a specified time)
Number of unique participants who submit at least one entry
Number of entries submitted by each entrant in a contest
Mean of all possible pairwise similarity ratings from survey panel in a contest

Logo-level correlations (11,380 observations):
Variable
(1) Rating
(2) Visibility (blind)
(3) Domain
(4) Site
(5) Day
(6) Judge
(7) # Prior entries
(8) Max
(9) Personal best

Mean
2.41
0.37
1.40
0.39
5.09
22.68
52.77
3.04
1.75

St. dev.
1.18
0.48
1.01
0.49
1.89
11.34
44.66
0.96
1.32

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.03
-0.03
0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
0.03
0.07

-0.15
0.07
0.03
-0.06
-0.31
0.06
-0.07

0.18
0.00
0.05
-0.1
-0.11
0.08

-0.00
-0.12
-0.3
0.05
-0.08

0.05
0.58
0.42
0.11

0.23
-0.18
0.01

0.4
0.12

-0.09

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.26
-0.30
0.22
0.06
0.31
-0.33
0.16

0.00
0.00
-0.50
-0.42
0.01
-0.83

0.00
-0.18
-0.41
0.52
-0.10

-0.41
-0.24
-0.56
-0.18

Table 7b (continued)
Contest-level correlations (8 observations):
Variable
(1) Rating
(2) Visibility (blind)
(3) Domain
(4) Site
(10) # Entries
(11) # Entrants
(12) # Entries/entrant
(13) Avg. contest similarity

Mean
2.41
0.50
1.50
0.50
83.13
28.13
3.06
0.19

St. dev.
0.04
0.19
0.42
0.19
16.67
4.16
0.34
0.01

(10)

0.87
0.19
0.70

(11)

-0.28
0.65

(12)

0.07

23

7
7.1

Analysis+and+Results+
Entry
Our main variable of interest is entry visibility, denoted in our experiments as either blind (low

visibility) or unblind (high visibility). To understand how differences in entry visibility affect agent
behavior, we estimate variations of the model:
Yi = α + β(Entry Visibility)i + δi + εi .
The dependent variable Y varies over the contests i and takes on one of the outcome variables discussed
above (entries, entrants, entries per entrant). Since these measures are all counts, our model assumes a
negative binomial distribution 4 , which adds an over-dispersion parameter and is generally more
conservative than estimates with a Poisson count model (Hilbe 2011). To control for differences across
contests, which could influence our behavior measures if not accounted for, we include several fixed
effect controls (δi) for the domain and site. Table 7a provides variable details and gives descriptive
statistics and correlations for the variables used in our analysis.
Table 8 shows the results of our negative binomial regression analysis around entry. We begin by
estimating the baseline model (column 8-1) by relating entries per contest to entry visibility and including
our contest fixed effects – domain and site. We find that increasing visibility (from blind to unblind)
results in a significant increase in number of entries for a contest. The magnitude of this effect is over 39
additional entries per unblind tournament5 – a substantial 60% increase from blind cases. Because our
contests occur over time, we extend the model to include day as an explanatory effect and entries per day
as the dependent variable (column 8-2). We further account for dynamic contest qualities like competition
by including our measures of agent experience and talent, which are all reported as cumulative daily
averages for unique entrants. This means those agent measures reflect the mean experience or talent
participating in the contest up to that point. The coefficient observed for day is positive and significant,
showing that more entries arrive at the end of contests, which matches our experience with this domain
and these platforms in the past. Of our experience and skill measures, average reputation is negative and
significant – higher average skill scores of prior entrants result in fewer entries per day. Overall, these
results mirror our baseline model, with significantly fewer submissions (coeff: -0.286, p-value: 0.007) in
blind contests.
Increased entries in unblind contests could stem from attracting more entrants or from enticing
existing agents to submit more ideas, as outlined in section 3.1. Our participant models (columns 8-3 and
8-4) address the first alternative, with negative binomial regressions using entrants per contest and

4

In assuming a negative binomial distribution for our dependent variable counts, our model includes a log link, and
the resulting log-linear function can be represented as ln(Yi) = α + β(Entry Visibility)i + δi + εi .
5
Given by exp(4.647) – exp(4.647-0.472) = 39.2
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Table 8. Comparison of Contest Productivity between Visibility Treatments

Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Constant

8-1
Entries
per contest

8-2
Entries
per day

8-3
Entrants
per contest

8-4
Entrants
per day

8-5
Entries
per entrant

Contest
fixed effects
4.647 ***

Day, talent,
experience
1.708 *

Contest
fixed effects
3.667 ***

Day, talent,
experience
-0.213

Contest
fixed effects
0.970 ***

(0.225)

Treatment
Blind
Fixed effects

-0.472 **

(0.993)

-0.286 ***

(0.265)

-0.371 *

(1.244)

-0.324 **

-0.078

(0.185)

(0.107)

(0.225)

(0.128)

(0.124)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Explanatory Variables
Day

0.288 ***

0.222 ***

(0.026)

(0.032)

Avg. days of experience

-0.003

0.007

(0.006)

(0.007)

Avg, contests won

-0.175

-0.012

Avg. reputation (z-score)

-0.722 ***

(0.114)

(0.011)

-0.575 *

(0.245)

Chi-squared test
Mean Response
Observations
DF

(0.143)

9.6
83.10
8
5

102.2
12.09
55
9

(0.322)

5.1
28.13
8
5

76.6
5.98
55
9

14.7
2.96
225
5

!Negative!binomial!regression!on!contest!productivity!counts,!base!case!is!Unblind!visibility!
!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01! !
!Standard!errors!given!in!parentheses!
!

!Note:!!8?4!reports!on!every!unique!daily!entrant;!robust!to!excluding!entrants!who!submitted!on!prior!days.!
!Mean!Response!listed!is!log?transformed!to!show!actual!values!for!dependent!variable!measure.!!

entrants per day as the dependent variables. In both cases, more agents are choosing to participate in
unblind contests. The magnitude of this effect is about 12 more entrants per unblind contest.6 It should be
noted that our baseline entrant model (column 8-3) isn’t significant at the overall level, even though its
message is consistent. As before, our daily model (column 8-4) presents a better characterization of the
contest environment and includes controls for dynamic contest elements – both time and participant
characteristics.7 The coefficient for entrants is negative and significant (coeff: -0.324, p-value: 0.011),
suggesting that fewer entrants participate in blind contests. If we look specifically at entries per entrant
across the contests (column 8-5), we see no differences in behavior, with 225 agents submitting on
average 2.96 entries per contest regardless of entry visibility. This resonates nicely with the prior finding
that submitting extra entries in unblind contests doesn’t increase an agent’s chance of winning (Bockstedt
et al. 2011).
6
7

Given by exp(3.667) – exp(3.667-0.371) = 12.1
We exclude participant characteristic variables from 8-1 and 8-3 because of limited degrees of freedom.
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These results support Hypothesis 1. Unblind contests generate more entries; however they do this not
by inducing more entries from existing agents but by increasing the number of agents that participate. An
interpretation of this result is that entry visibility reduces barriers to entry, allowing easier exploration of
the search landscape and enticing more agents to search for a solution and submit.
We also perform a number of robustness checks to address potential concerns. In addition to day (our
control for how much of a contest has elapsed), we add a categorical day of the week variable to account
for the fact that some days might have different behavior patterns (i.e., Saturday may see fewer agents
online). Another concern might be that the dependent variables in our daily models (8-2 and 8-4) might
suffer from serial correlation across days. In addition to several tests (such as Durbin-Watson calculations
via STATA and by hand) that indicate no auto-correlation, we add lagged variables for entries and
entrants to our specification and observe results consistent with our daily models. Finally, we address
alternate calculations of experience and talent, including (a) totals instead of averages and (b) rolling
averages that are inclusive of repeat entrants instead of inclusive. In each of these cases, we find no
differences in our primary findings.
To corroborate these results and further check robustness, we run a similar analysis on 44,582 logo
contests from 99Designs from 2009-2012. These contests were those conducted in $US and unlocked
(meaning a winner was chosen and the site rules followed), and they account for 78% of all logo contests
during that time. We include fixed effects to control for contest characteristics that were stable in our
experiments, including prize amount, prize guarantee, and level of engagement from the administrator.
The results (in Appendix B) show that blind contests enjoy significantly fewer entries (coeff: -0.33***) and
entrants (coeff: -0.29***), similar to our experiment results in Table 8. The size of this visibility effect in
the panel regression is roughly equivalent to $83 in prize money, so making a contest’s entries blind has
the same participation effect as reducing the prize by 23%. These findings add additional evidence that
our experiment results are both directionally correct and consistent with broader contest trends for these
platforms.
7.2

Characteristics of Entries – Similarity
Having shown that the entry decision varies with entry visibility, we now turn to how that behavior

impacts the search process. We use our pairwise similarity measures (from section 4.2) to determine
whether designers create submissions that are more similar when they are permitted to see others’ entries.
First, we examine the contests at an aggregate level by comparing the average contest similarity with a
simple t-test on the means (Table 9). Average contest similarity is the mean of all possible pairwise
similarities within a contest. This captures, independent of when logos were submitted, how alike our lab
group believed a contest’s entries to be. We find that in aggregate, average similarity in unblind contests
is approximately 14% greater and significant (0.194 vs. 0.170; t-statistic 2.59). This is meaningful, and
supports Hypothesis 2, but to better capture the degree to which agents are incorporating elements from
prior designs, we extend our analysis.
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Table 9. Comparison of Idea Similarity within Contests
!
Overall contest similarity score (mean of all contest pairwise scores): !
!

!!!!
!
!
!
!!!Average!Pairwise!Similarity!
!!!Number!of!observations!

!
!
!

Blind! !
0.170! !
!!!!4!
!

Unblind!
!!0.193!
!!!!!!4!!!!!!.!!

!

!!!T?statistic:!!!2.59!**!
!
!!!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01!!!(two?tailed!test)!
!!!Overall!contest!similarity!score!is!mean!of!each!pairwise!score!in!a!contest.!
!!!Robust!to!more!conservative!measures!(i.e.,!omitting!any!pairs!from!the!same!designer)!

Logo-level similarity scores:

Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Constant
Treatment
Blind
Fixed effects

9-1
Similarity to
prior entries

9-2
Similarity to
prior entries

9-3
Similarity to
prior entries

Contest
fixed effects
0.230 ***

Interaction
with day
0.406 ***

Interaction
with period
0.724 ***

(0.016)

(0.027)

(0.037)

-0.038 ***

-0.158 ***

-0.529 ***

(0.014)

(0.039)

(0.058)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Timing
Day

-0.034 ***
(0.004)

Day x Blind

0.024 ***
(0.007)

Period

-0.509 ***
(0.035)

Period x Blind

0.506 ***
(0.058)

R-squared
Mean Response
Observations
DF

0.03
0.21
633
5

0.12
0.21
633
7

0.27
0.21
633
7

!OLS!regression!on!idea!similarity!scores,!base!case!is!Unblind!visibility!
!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01! !
!Standard!errors!given!in!parentheses!
!
!

!Note:!!Logo?level!similarity!score!is!mean!similarity!of!each!entry!to!prior!entries.!Period!is!binary!and!defined!as!!
!the!first!day!(0)!or!days!two!through!seven!(1).!Robust!to!only!first!entries.!
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Model 9-1 shows the baseline results of our linear regression for submission similarity. Our
dependent variable is logo-level similarity, which for each entry is the degree of similarity to prior
submissions. We find that increasing visibility (from blind to unblind) results in entries that are
significantly more similar. The magnitude of the effect is such that unblind contests were rated as 20%
more similar. Including time effects (column 9-2), however, notable differences emerge. While entries in
unblind contests are much more similar initially, by the final day, that difference has been erased. At that
point, entries to unblind contests are just as unique as those in their blind counterparts. Probing a bit
further (column 9-3), we can use period categorical variables to see that the difference between blind and
unblind contests in terms of entry similarity happens almost exclusively in the first day of our
experiments. After that, there is no discernible difference between the treatments. Figure 3 highlights
these composite effects, with the coefficient point estimates for columns 9-2 and 9-3 represented as lines
and points, respectively.
'
Figure 3. Entry Similarity over Time

Logo-level similarity score

0.8"
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Note:!!Lines!represent!coefficient!point!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!estimates!from!model!9?2,!with!Day!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!as!a!continuous!variable.!
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!

!!!!!!!!!!!!Dots!represent!coefficient!point!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!estimates!from!model!9?3,!with!time!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!modeled!as!a!binary!indicator!of!the!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!first!day!vs.!subsequent!days!
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The implication is that while unblind contests do encourage submissions that are more similar, that
phenomenon is limited to the early stages of the contest. Several things could be happening. This could be
because participants only incorporate elements from prior entries early in the process. More likely, once
there is a sufficient breadth of entries, inspiration will have more seeds from which to spring and the
resulting conformity will be harder to detect. This could be the result of a diffusion process, in which an
initial seed is planted and ideas radiate out from that seed. As the ideas radiate out into a larger area, there
are a greater number of seeds from which to create an incremental variant and average similarity declines.
This explanation is plausible, given the results over the course of the contest. The data suggests that by
increasing the visibility within tournaments, resulting submission are more similar, but that this effect
quickly disappears. On balance, it appears to not overwhelm the pool of entries with conformity, which is
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beneficial from the administrator’s standpoint.
7.3

Characteristics of Entries – Quality
Table 10 shows the results of a regression analysis with logo rating as the dependent variable; our

explanatory variables and contest fixed effects (section 4.3) are also included. We use a clustered OLS
because there are multiple ratings for each logo and our explanatory variables are observed at the level of
the logo, not the level of the rating. In our baseline model (column 10-1), we find that blind contests
result in higher quality entries. This result is marginally significant and in the opposite direction of our
hypothesis, which predicted that unblind contests would return better entries on average. Recall that there
was some evidence of such a relationship, but we believed the balance of evidence would push the net
Table 10. Comparison of Contest Quality between Visibility Treatments

Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Constant

10-1
Ratings
(all entries)
Number of
entries
2.098 ***
(0.111)

Treatment
Blind

0.084 *

10-2
Ratings
(all entries)
Contest
results
2.010 ***
(0.130)

-0.232 *

10-3
Ratings
(re-submits)
Contest
results
0.493 **
(0.225)

-0.366

(0.051)

(0.131)

(0.254)

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.001

0.001

-0.001

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

Entries x Blind

0.003

0.007 ***

(0.003)

(0.002)

Max

0.070 ***

0.114 ***

Max x Blind

0.009
(0.043)

(0.045)

Personal best

0.023

0.528 ***

(0.021)

(0.068)

Personal best x Blind

0.094 ***

0.243 ***

(0.033)

(0.085)

Reputation

0.154 ***

0.033

(0.027)

(0.035)

Reputation x Blind

0.058

-0.006

(0.047)

(0.049)

0.11
2.41
11,380
52

0.20
2.40
7,050
52

Fixed effects
Explanatory variables
Entries

(0.023)

R-squared
Mean Response
Observations
DF

0.08
2.41
11,380
45

(0.027)

-0.124 ***

!OLS!regression!on!individual!ratings,!clustered!by!logo,!base!case!is!Unblind!visibility!
!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01! !
!Robust!clustered!standard!errors!given!in!parentheses!
!
!

!Note:!!Robust!to!different!measures!of!agent!expertise,!including!an!agent’s!highest/final!personal!best.!
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effect in the other direction. Agent talent was a key determinant in that argument, so we attempt to
approximate agent expertise and explore this result further.
In addition to our platform measure of skill (reputation), we also include personal best – a variable
that captures the best score an individual has received on prior submissions. If success were random and
previous scores weren’t predictive of future entries for a given agent, then this metric would be
ineffective. However, if we ignore agents who only submit once (for which there are no prior scores), the
correlation between personal best and rating is 0.30. If we look at an agent’s highest personal best
globally and compare that talent measure to all their ratings, the correlation is 0.71. In a noisy
environment, it indicates there is information in this measure of performance.
Interestingly, when we include our explanatory variables to control for the amount of information in
the contest and the performance of the designers, our main effect switches signs (column 10-2). Now, we
observe that the previous result of blind being better (column 10-1) seems to be partially driven by better
designers opting in to a few of the contests. A simple t-test on entrant reputation shows no difference in
blind versus unblind contests overall. The effect of visibility differs, however, based on agent talent. We
observe that unblind contests are better for new entrants (who have no previous best entry) and lowquality designers. High-quality agents perform better in blind contests. Thus, the benefit of entry visibility
depends on the type of participants in a given contest.
For this reason, we test one further extension by explicitly modeling just repeat submitters (column
10-3). In this case, low-quality designers in blind and unblind contests submit entries that are identical in
quality. As expertise grows, submission quality improves more for blind contests, mirroring the result in
column 10-2. If repeating agents are strictly better off in the blind condition, then it is one-time entrants
who benefit disproportionately from entry visibility (Figure 4). This lends additional strength to our
theory that unblind contests add value by lowering the barriers to entry. Those low-effort designers, who
don’t submit more than once, benefit from being able to see high quality entries. Looking at Max – the
best prior entry by others – we see that with submission visibility, new entries mirror the best existing
quality and appear anchored to past results. This effect completely goes away in the blind case, as one
would expect. If agents can’t see other entries, submission quality decreases with better prior entries,
consistent with economic theory around incentive effects (Boudreau et al. 2011). These findings support
our hypothesis in part, but also add a new layer of understanding to the tournament literature.
Our final measure of interest is variance in quality. Table 11 starts with a baseline model (column 81) that relates our de-trended measure of quality variance to entry visibility and includes contest fixed
effects – domain and site. We find that increasing visibility (from blind to unblind) reduces the variance
in quality we see in the submission ratings. When including day and number of entries as explanatory
variables (columns 8-2 and 8-3), our results hold, with variation in the blind setting growing with number
of entries. This trend is reasonable; the differences in contest visibility grow over time, as more aggregate
information is available. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4.
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Figure 4. Submission Quality given Search Landscape
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Note:!!Repeat!Entrants!graph!given!by!coefficient!point!estimates!from!model!10?3;!
Single?entry!Entrants!from!modified!model!10?2!(with!only!single?entry!entrants)!

Table 11. Comparison of Contest Variance between Visibility Treatments

Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Constant
Treatment
Blind
Fixed effects

11-1
Variance
(de-trended)

11-2
Variance
(de-trended)

11-3
Variance
(de-trended)

Contest
fixed effects
0.464 ***

Contest
day
0.408 ***

Interaction
with entries
0.454 ***

(0.034)

(0.047)

(0.049)

0.090 ***

0.088 ***

0.023

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.047)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Timing
Day

0.011 *
(0.007)

Entries
Entries

-0.014
(0.011)

0.001 **
(0.001)

Entries x Blind

0.003 **
(0.001)

R-squared
Mean Response
Observations
DF

'

0.13
0.26
665
5

0.13
0.26
665
6

0.15
0.26
665
8

'

!OLS!regression!on!quality!de?trended!variation!at!the!logo!level,!adjusted!for!Judge,!base!case!is!Unblind!
!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01! !
!Standard!errors!given!in!parentheses!
!

5"
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8

Discussion++
To understand and characterize the implications of a relatively new decision afforded to innovation

contest administrators – that of entry visibility – we examined two primary pathways of influence: (1) the
likelihood of entry from an agent and (2) the resulting characteristics of entries in a contest. The related
hypotheses we pose in Section 3 are largely supported.
In addressing the first pathway, we find that unblind contests generate more entries; however they do
this not by inducing more entries from existing agents but by increasing the number of agents that
participate. For the second pathway, we examine characteristics for both submission similarity and the
quality distribution of entries and find the effect of visibility depends on the setting. Unblind contests
encourage submissions that are more similar, mostly in the early stages of the contest. For single-entry
participants, entry quality “ratchets up” with the best previous entry if it’s visible, while moving in the
opposite direction if it’s not. However, for invested participants who submit more than once, those with
better prior submissions improve more in the absence of entry visibility. Variance in entry quality also
improves in the absence of entry visibility.
8.1

Managerial Implications
This research is motivated by the managerial question of whether or not an innovation tournament

administrator can improve outcomes based on the moderating decisions within the contest. We found
strong evidence to suggest that there are very real differences that result from those decisions. While we
cannot extrapolate our results to all innovation contests, understanding the implications of participant
entry, idea similarity from search, and contest outcomes should permit managers to more effectively tailor
contests for optimal output. Specifically, we uncovered three key decisions contest administrators should
manage.
First, managers should be aware that barriers to entry are an important consideration. Unblind
contests can attract more entrants, likely because they permit easier search. Casual observers can see
exemplars to kick-start their idea development. This doesn’t increase the number of entries submitted by
each solver, but it does get more solvers in the door.
Second, participant motivation has an effect. The learning environment of unblind contests is better
than in blind contests for participants that only submit one entry; seeing a good entry prompts them to
come up with a better submission. This is not the case for repeat submitters, who produce better ideas in
blind contests. So in an internal company tournament where employees are motivated to participate and
likely to submit multiple entries, blind contests may promote better quality (and more varied) ideas.
However, in a crowdsourced contest via social media, unblind contests will likely provide better access to
landscape exploration and learning and consequently a better result.
Third, entry visibility does impact similarity in designs, but less than we imagined. Unblind contests
see a higher level of similarity than blind contests, but the effect quickly goes away. The fear that
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designers will get stuck in one part of the search landscape does not manifest itself in our data. It appears
that participants can use other submissions and create incremental variants that are sufficiently different
quickly and efficiently.
8.2

Limitations
Given the fact that we performed this experiment with real designers instead of in a lab, we could not

use some potentially interesting designs. The reaction of the same individual under different treatments
would be interesting and potentially feasible in a lab study, although in our case, it was not possible.
While the contests were constructed to be nearly identical, we made slight changes in the details in
order to avoid detection in the marketplaces. Although we control for contest fixed effects, different
challenges could attract fundamentally different types of agents, which could introduce unaccounted for
bias into our model.
Beyond this, the backdrop that served for our study deserves some mention. Our setting is nice in
that it uses real marketplaces and real designers to test these theories. In addition, logos and graphic
design are nice in that the whole idea is represented visually. This may help give insight into more
complex domains. However, in graphic design contests (such as those around logos), the effort needed to
produce any single idea is relatively small, which could also have implications. Unblind contests may be
more acceptable in such situations because the level of investment is minimal. Contests requiring more
substantial investment or areas with substantial benefits to intellectual property may not flourish under the
same conditions.
8.3

Future Work
As the first to look at the differences of entry visibility on innovation contest outcomes, we have just

begun our understanding of this moderating decision. The following questions seem promising for future
exploration:
• How does entry visibility apply to different settings? There are plenty of administrator decisions
that could improve performance depending on the characteristics of the contest, the solvers, and their
interaction with the entry visibility design choice.
• Do different classes of problems behave in the same way? Do algorithmic contests match graphic
design contests as related to entry visibility?
• If similarity between ideas does get lost in the unblind case fairly quickly, what density of solvers
or entries would be required to again pick up on similarity in ideas? Would a less densely populated
ideation landscape change this finding?
• Diverse perspectives are seen as a benefit of open innovation (Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010). Here,
we used a pool of solvers from an established contest platform. Controlling for innate solver
characteristics would be an interesting direction to further extend the understanding from the level of the
agent.

33

References
ALICKE, M. D., M. L. KLOTZ, D. L. BREITENBECHER, T. J. YURAK, and D. S. VREDENBURG
(1995): “Personal Contact, Individuation, and the Better-than-Average Effect,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 804-825.
ÅSTEBRO, T., S. A. JEFFREY, and G. K. ADOMDZA (2007): "Inventor Perseverance After Being Told
to Quit: The Role of Cognitive Biases." Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 253-272.
BOCKSTEDT, J., A. MISHRA, and C. DRUEHL (2012): “Do Participation Strategy and Experience
Impact the Likelihood of Winning in Unblind Innovation Contests?,” working paper.
BOUDREAU, K. J., N. LACETERA, and K. R. LAKHANI (2011): “Incentives and Problem Uncertainty
in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis,” Management Science, 57, 843-863.
BULLINGER, A. C., A. NEYER, M. RASS, and K. M. MOESLEIN (2010): “Community-Based
Innovation Contests: Where Competition Meets Cooperation,” Creativity and Innovation
Management, 19, 290-303.
CASAS-ARCE, P., and F. A. MARTÍNEZ-JEREZ (2009): “Relative Performance Compensation,
Contests, and Dynamic Incentives,” Management Science, 55, 1306-1320.
CHE, Y. and I. GALE (2003): “Optimal Design of Research Contests,” The American Economic Review,
93, 646-671.
DAHAN, E. and H. MENDELSON (2001): “An Extreme Value Model of Concept Testing,”
Management Science, 47, 102-116.
DAHL, D. W. and P. MOREAU (2002): “The Influence and Value of Analogical Thinking During New
Product Ideation,” Journal of Marketing Research, 39, 47-60.
DOW, S. P., J. FORTUNA, D. SCHWARTZ, B. ALTRINGER, D. L. SCHWARTZ, and S. R.
KLEMMER (2012): “Prototyping Dynamics: Sharing Multiple Designs Improves Exploration,
Group Rapport, and Results,” Design Thinking Research, 47-70.
ERAT, S. and V. KRISHNAN (2012): “Managing Delegated Search Over Design Spaces,” Management
Science, 58, 606-623.
FULLERTON, R. L. and R. P. McAFEE (1999): “Auctioning Entry into Tournaments,” American
Economic Review, 107, 573-605.
GIROTRA, K., C. TERWIESCH, and K. T. ULRICH (2010): “Idea Generation and the Quality of the
Best Idea,” Management Science, 56, 591-605.
GUO, S. and M. W. FRASER (2009): Propensity Score Analysis: Statistical Methods and Applications,
Sage Publications.
HAMILTON, B. H. and J. A. Nickerson (2003). “Correcting for Endogeneity in Strategic Management
Research,” Strategic Organization, 1, 51-78.
HECKMAN, J. (1979): "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Econometrica, 47, 153-61.
HILBE, J. M. (2011): Negative Binomial Regression, Cambridge University Press.
JEPPESEN, L. B. and K. R. LAKHANI (2010): “Marginality and Problem-Solving Effectiveness in
Broadcast Search," Organization Science, 21, 1016-1033.
KAHNEMAN, D. and A. TVERSKY (1977): Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures,
McLean VA: Decisions and Designs Inc.

34
KORNISH, L. and K. ULRICH (2011): “Opportunity Spaces in Innovation: Empirical Analysis of Large
Samples of Ideas,” Management Science, 57, 107-128.
LAKHANI, K. R., L. B. JEPPESEN, P. A. LOHSE, and J. A. PANETTA (2007): “The Value of
Openness in Scientific Problem Solving,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, 07-050.
LAZEAR, E. P., and S. ROSEN (1981): “Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,”
Journal of Political Economics, 89, 841-864.
LEE, B., S. SRIVASTAVA, R. KUMAR, R. BRAFMAN, and S. R. KLEMMER (2010): “Designing
with Interactive Example Galleries,” Proceedings of the conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems, ACM, 2257-2266.
MARCH, J. (1991): “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science, 2,
71-87.
MARSH, R. L., J. D. LANDAU, and J. L. HICKS (1996): “How Examples May (and May Not) Contrain
Creativity,” Memory & Cognition, 24, 669-680.
MERTON, R. K. (1942): The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
METCALFE, J.S. (1994): “The Economics of Evolution and the Economics of Technology Policy,”
Economic Journal, 104, 931-944.
MULKAY, M. (1975): “Three Models of Scientific Development,” Sociological Review, 23, 509-526.
NELSON, R. R. and S. WINTER (1982): An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
SMITH, S. M., T. B. WARD, and J. S. SCHUMACHER (1993): “Constraining Effects of Examples in a
Creative Generation Task,” Memory & Cognition, 21, 837-845.
TABACHNICK, B. G and L. S. FIDELL (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
TAYLOR, C. R. (1995): “Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments,”
American Economic Review, 85, 872-890.
TERWIESCH, C. and K. T. ULRICH (2009): Innovation Tournaments: Creating and Selecting
Exceptional Opportunities, Harvard Business School Press.
TERWIESCH, C. and Y. XU (2008): “Innovation Contests, Open Innovation, and Multiagent Problem
Solving,” Management Science, 54, 1529-1543.
VON HIPPEL, E. (2005): Democratizing Innovation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
WALTER, T. and A. BACK (2011): “Towards Measuring Crowdsourcing Success: An Empirical Study
on Effects of External Factors in Online Idea Contest,” 6th Mediterranean Conference on
Information Systems.
WARD, T. B. (1994): “Structured Imagination: The Role of Category Structure in Exemplar Generation,”
Cognitive Psychology, 27, 1-40.
WOOTEN, J., and K. ULRICH (2014): “Idea Generation and the Role of Feedback: Evidence from Field
Experiments with Innovation Tournaments,” working paper.
YANG, Y., P. CHEN, and P. PAVLOU (2010): “Managing Open Innovation Contests in Online Market,”
working paper.

35
Appendix A. Sample Design Briefs
99Designs – Power Perk Coffee
BUSINESS NAME:

Power Perk Coffee
DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS:

A better cup of coffee at home – Power Perk focuses on the best ingredients, processes, and
accessories for coffee drinkers.
PREFERRED LOGO TYPES:

None specified
COLOR PREFERENCES:

No restrictions on color
TO BE USED ON:

Print (Business cards, letterheads, brochures etc.)
Online (Website, online advertising, banner ads etc.)
Merchandise (Mugs, T-shirts etc.)
NOTES:

Branding - Logo should work across the entire line of coffee products (beans, percolators, and
accessories).
Demographics - Our target audience is young adult coffee drinkers (18-35 years old) in the US
who are college-educated.

CrowdSpring – Bold Brew Tea
WHAT IS THE EXACT NAME YOU WOULD LIKE IN YOUR LOGO?

Bold Brew Tea
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER INFO OR LINKS YOU WANT TO SHARE?

Industry - Home Tea Brewing. Tea leaves, brewing systems, and other accessories for tea
drinkers.
Demographics - The focus is on the young adult market in the US. 18-35 year olds who are
college-educated and discovering tea as a great beverage alternative.
WHAT ARE THE TOP 3 THINGS YOU’D LIKE TO COMMUNICATE THROUGH YOUR LOGO?

The brand should work over the whole line of tea products. High quality ingredients and
processes are the foundation for our image and great-tasting product.
WHAT LOGO STYLES DO YOU LIKE (IMAGE + TEXT, IMAGE ONLY, TEXT ONLY, ETC.)

- Any colors/styles
- No restrictions
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Appendix B. Comparison of Contest Productivity and Visibility on 99Designs (whole site)

Dependent variable
Constant
Explanatory variables
Blind

B-1
Entries
per contest
2.943 ***

B-2
Entrants
per contest
2.121 ***

(0.015)

(0.014)

-0.333 ***

-0.289 ***

(0.010)

(0.009)

Prize amount ($US)

0.003 ***

0.003 ***

(0.000)

(0.000)

Guaranteed prize

0.468 ***

0.452 ***

(0.006)

(0.006)

Engagement (% scored)

0.806 ***

0.165 ***

(0.015)

(0.015)

28,388.0
132.95
44,582
4

27,770.7
34.16
44,582
4

Chi-squared test
Mean Response
Observations
DF

!Negative!binomial!regression!on!contest!productivity!counts!
!Significance!levels:!!*!<0.10,!**!<0.05,!***!<!0.01! !
!Standard!errors!given!in!parentheses!
!

!Notes:!!!Mean!Response!listed!is!log?transformed!to!show!actual!values!for!dependent!variable!measure.!!
rd
!
Blind!results!in!fewer!entries!and!entrants!in!3 !party!contests,!corroborating!our!experiments.!
!
Bigger!%!impact!on!entrants!than!entries,!also!corroborating.!Blind!same!as!reducing!prize!by!$83.!
!Data:!!! 44,582!logo!contests!(2009?12;!in!US$!with!unlocked!archives;!78%!of!all!logo!contests)!
!

